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Kuhns: Sealed Adoption Records

THE SEALED ADOPTION
RECORDS CONTROVERSY:
BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS
OF SECRECY
Jason Kuhns·

"Secrets are powerful. They are powerful producers of curiosity, action, guilt, rumor, and panic.
They cause people to feel worthless. They demean
and shame people. They haunt people and they
obsess people. The impact of secrets is jolting and
far-reaching. "I

I. INTRODUCTION

When a child is adopted in the United States, the adoptee's
original birth certificate and the records from the adoption proceedings are placed under seal,2 States issue new birth certificates pronouncing the adoptee as born to the adoptive parents. s
Nearly. every state has enacted legislation to permanently seal
these records;" thus, even adult adoptees do not have an absolute right to access them. II This process has created a clash between adult adoptees who desire access to these original records
identifying their biological parents and the states' policy of secrecy. States have made some progress in this "sealed records"
*

Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995.
1. CYNTHIA D. MARTIN, BEATING THE ADOPTION GAME 226 (1988).
2. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10,434 (West 1994).
3. See, e.g., id. § 10,433.
4. Alaska and Kansas currently allow adoptees access to their original birth certificates upon reaching majority. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2423 (1992).
5. Although these states permanently seal the adoptee's original birth certificate and
the records from the adoption proceedings, statutory provisions exist for opening these
records upon court order. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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controversy by amending their statutes to reflect changing social
mores. s However, to keep pace with societal needs, states must
go further in allowing adult adoptees easier access to their original birth records.
This article will discuss the statutory history of adoption in
the United States and advocate why a present day understanding of the interests of the parties to the adoption process requires that adoptees have greater access to these records. The
author will examine the reasons why current statutory ap'proaches do not adequately address adoptees' needs and recommend a procedural device that would sufficiently balance the interests of the parties to this controversy.
II. THE HISTORY OF SEALED RECORDS IN THE
UNITED STATES
English common law did not recognize the practice of adoption. 7 Thus, in the United States adoption law is entirely a creation of statute. S In 1851 the Massachusetts Legislature passed
the first general adoption law. 9 From the beginning, American
adoption law protected the "best interests of the child."lo The
first statutes did not bar access to court records,11 for adoption
6. See infra notes 29·47 and accompanying text.
7. Adoption was not introduced into common law because the concept conflicted
with the principles of inheritance. The English held the belief that land should only be
inherited by blood relatives. See Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 745·46 (1956); James R. Carter, Comment, Confidentiality
of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817, 817·18 (1978).
8. Because United States law has its roots in English common law which does not
provide for adoption, adoption law had to be created by statute. "In the absence of com·
mon law precedent, American jurisdictions did not develop the concept of adoption juris·
prudentially but deferred to legislative authority." Carter, supra note 7, at 818. See also
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div.
1977).
9. 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324. See Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of
the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 465 (1971).
10. The attention to the needs of the parentless child was a break from the tradi·
tional focus on the childless parent. Historically, children were recognized only as prop·
erty or 'chattel' of their parents or as wards of the state. Ruth·Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958·1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173 (1983). See also Nancy
Sparks, Note, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record Laws-Constitutional Violation or a
Need for Judicial Reform?, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 575, 577·78 (1982) (stating that before the
statutory law, the primary purpose of adoption was to provide the adopting parents with
an heir).
11. See Joan H. Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Consequences,

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/9

2

Kuhns: Sealed Adoption Records

1994]

SEALED ADOPTION RECORDS

261

proceedings were generally informal, and confidentiality was not
a significant issue. 12
The New York law of 1916 was among the first statutes to
provide for confidentiality by mandating that illegitimacy not
appear in the transcript of the judicial proceedings. IS This statute "barred all persons from inspecting the files and records of
an adoption except for the parties to the adoption."u Thus, confidentiality merely concealed the adoption proceedings from the
public, not from the actual participants.
Institutionalized secrecy was introduced into American
adoption in 1917 with Minnesota's enactment of the nation's
first sealed records law closing adoption files from inspection by
adult adoptees, their birth parents, and the general public. 111
Other states were slow to follow Minnesota's lead, but in 1938,
the Child Welfare League of America began promoting secrecy
in adoption as official policy.16 By the end of the 1940's, most
states had followed suit. 17 These "sealed records" laws purported to erase the stigma of illegitimacy by ensuring equal status and treatment of adopted and non-adopted offspring. IS
States began to view the adoptee as "reborn" to a new family
and possessing a new identity.19 States sealed the original birth
certificate and replaced it with an amended one. 20
Beyond the purpose of protecting the welfare of the
adoptee, the state legislatures intended the statutes to foster
productive relationships between adoptees and adoptive parents
without the threat of interference from the biological parents. 21
ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE, 13-1, 13-5 n.6 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1991).
12. Id. at 13-4 to 13-5.
13. 1916 N.Y. Laws ch. 453, § 113. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-5.
14.Id.
15. 1917 Minn. Laws ch. 222, p.337. See HAL AIGNER, ADOPTION IN AMERICA COMING
OF AGE 8 (1992); Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-5.
16. AIGNER, supra note IS, at 8.
17. Id.
18. ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL .• THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 37 (1978) (stating that
adoption experts felt the adoptee should not be held responsible for the sins of the
parent).
19. Id. at 38.
20.Id.
21. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 779, 781 (1976).
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Further, states believed confidentiality afforded the biological
mother a chance to rebuild her life with the assurance that the
ordeal would not become public knowledge. 22
Secrecy has continued to pervade the adoption process, but
during the 1970's adoptees organized 23 and began to assert a
"right to know" the truth about their origins. 24 In response to
these challenges, state legislatures again began amending their
statutes to recognize the concerns of adoptees. 211 These amendments generally allow adoptees access to their original birth
records under special circumstances which are defined as "good
cause."26 Additional amendments provide for the release of identifying information to adoptees if the birth parents file their
consent with a registry.27
III. CURRENT STATUTORY APPROACHES
No statute in the United States allows adoptees unlimited
access to the records of their adoption proceedings. However,
there are currently two states which allow adoptees of legal majority access to their original birth certificates which disclose the
identity of their biological parents. 28 Most states have enacted
22. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 649; Sparks, supra note 10, at 578.
23. In 1972, Florence Fisher founded the Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association,
now the ALMA Society. Since that time, the number of searchers has increased dramatically, and orthodox American adoption has been held to account for its philosophy and
procedures for the first time in its history. HAL AIGNER, FAINT TRAILS: A GUIDE To ADULT
ADOPTEE-BIRTH PARENT REUNIFICATION SEARCHES 7 (1986). Aigner states that searching
took root as a movement with the founding by adoptee Jean Paton of the country's first
search self-help organization, Orphan Voyage, in 1953. Aigner suggests that public recognition was slow to gather possibly due to the Civil Rights Movement, the resurgence of
political feminism, the Vietnam protests, and other causes of the ensuing time, competing more urgently for public attention. [d.
24. Adoptees argue that they have a constitutional right to their original birth
records. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text. Furthermore, many adoptees feel
a compelling psychological need to know the identity of their birth parents. See infra
notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of these statutes.
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 33 for a
list of factors which are balanced to determine if "good cause" exists.
27. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 9203,9204 (West Ann. 1993) (replacing CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 229.40, 229.50); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4138-c, 4138-d (McKinney Supp.
1993).
28. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1992). These states
allow adult adoptees to obtain their original birth certificates upon request without the
necessity of a judicial or administrative hearing. The original birth certificate provides an
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provisions allowing adoptees access to non-identifying information. 29 These states now require agencies or private intermediaries to complete comprehensive profiles of adoptees and
their biological parents at the time of adoption placement. so Although nearly every state gathers and shares background information available at the time of adoption, state policies still vary
considerably regarding the maintenance and disclosure of such
non-identifying information subsequent to placement. sl While
non-identifying information is more accessible today, states continue to prohibit disclosure of identifying information except
under special circumstances. 32
A.

THE "GOOD CAUSE" STATUTES

Most states which permanently seal adoption records provide for the release of information identifying biological parents
upon a judicial finding of "good cause."SS This burden is easiest
to establish if documented medical or psychiatric needs exist
and the adoptee cannot obtain the information elsewhere. S4 A
adoptee with the identities of his or her birth parents.
29. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-12 to 13-13. Non-identifying information
generally consists of the date and place of the adoptee's birth; the age of the biological
parents at the time of placement and a description of their general physical appearance;
the race, ethnicity and religion of the biological parents; the medical history of the biological parents and adoptee; whether the termination was voluntary or court-ordered; the
facts and circumstances relating to the adoptive placement; the age and sex of any other
children of the biological parents at the time of adoption; the educational levels of the
birth parents, their occupations, interests, skills, etc.; and any supplemental information
about the medical or social conditions of members of the biological family provided since
the adoption was complete. Id. at 13-13 to 13-14.
30. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 and § 45a-748 (West 1993) (stating
that the agency must provide certain information, if known, about the biological parents
to the adoptive parents and mandating the exercise of a reasonable effort by the agency
to obtain such information as a precondition to the granting of a decree of adoption).
31. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-14.
32. Id. at 13-20 to 13-21.
33. Id. at 13-21. In determining whether good cause for the release of identifying
information exists, courts uniformly balance the following competing interests: 1) the
nature of the circumstances dictating the need for release of the identity of the parents;
2) the circumstances and desires of the adoptive parents; 3) the circumstances of the
biological parents and the desire of at least the birth mother; and 4) the interest of the
state in maintaining a viable system of adoption by the assurance of confidentiality. In
re George, 625 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Mo. App. 1981); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1385
(R.1. 1986).
34. See, e.g., ALMA Society v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 995 (1979) (acknowledging that an appropriate showing of psychological
trauma, medical need, or of a religious identity crisis would require the New York courts
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few courts have allowed adoptees to contact their biological parents in the hope of obtaining more accurate and up-to-date medical information,811 but the mere desire of adoptees for data
about potential susceptibility is most often found insufficient to
justify releasing names of biological parents. 88 Courts will occasionally allow disclosure of adoption records to adult adoptees
who offer proof of a serious psychological disorder stemming
from an identity crisis. 87 However, mere curiosity will not
suffice. 88

B.

MUTUAL CONSENT REGISTRIES

In addition to a "good cause" statute, at least nineteen
states have enacted some form of a mutual consent registry
where parties to the adoption process can indicate their willingness to meet. 89 Both the biological parent and adult adoptee
under their own statute to grant permission to release all or part ·of the sealed adoption
records).
35. See, e.g., In re Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1981) (holding that an adult adoptee
who feared she was at risk of developing uterine cancer because her biological mother
might have taken DES while pregnant is entitled to inspect her adoption records).
36. See, e.g., Golan v. Louise Wise Services, 514 N.Y.S.2d 682, 686 (1987). The court
states:
[Als virtually any adopted person advances in age, his or her
genetic history will be desirable for treatment of a variety of
ailments including, for example, heart disease, diabetes and
cancer. A rule which automatically gave full disclosure to any
adopted person confronted with a medical problem with some
genetic implications would swallow New York's strong policy
against disclosure as soon as adopted people approached middle age.
Id.
37. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. App. 1982) (psychological
reasons may be sufficient to open sealed records); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1386 (severe psychological need to know one's origins may present compelling circumstances that
constitute good cause to permit adopted adults access to their birth records); Bradey v.
Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981) (implying that adoptee might have
shown good cause if he had required medical assistance for his feelings of insecurity or
demonstrated that he was unable to maintain steady employment or a stable family life
due to an identity crisis).
38. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (holding a
thinly supported claim of "psychological need to know" will not support a finding of
good cause); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1389 (implying that mere curiosity does not
amount to good cause).
39. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at app. 13-A (Supp. 1992) for a complete list of
these states. "Typically, biological parents are given the chance to manifest their consent
to the release of identifying information, either at the time of the adoption, or later upon
their own initiative." Melissa Arndt, Comment, Severed Roots: The Sealed Adoption
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must file a formal consent to the mutual disclosure of their identities; otherwise no identifying information is released. 40 Once a
"match" occurs, a state administrat~r or private adoption
agency will release the identifying information to the consenting
parties. 41
These statutes are considered passive in nature because the
states typically prohibit those involved with the registry from
assisting either the biological parent or the adoptee in actively
searching for each other.42 The mutual consent registries are
designed as a short cut to waive the good cause requirement
when both parties consent. 43 Thus, where a biological parent's
consent is not on file, the mutual consent states force the
adoptee to challenge confidentiality by meeting the state's "good
cause" standard.··
C.

"SEARCH AND CONSENT" PROCEDURES

At least seventeen states have amended their statutes to
more actively facilitate the exchange of information between
adoptees and biological parents than occurs with passive mutual
consent registries. 46 These "search and consent" laws authorize
public or private agencies to assist adult adoptees in locating biological parents to ascertain whether they are willing to disclose
their identities or actually meet with their adoptee}e Where the
biological parents refuse consent, these states will not release
identifying information unless the adoptee can establish "good
Records Controversy, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 103, 121 (1986). Adult adoptees are allowed to
manifest in writing their consent to release of identifying information about themselves.
Consent can be revoked by either party at any time. [d.
40. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 9203 (West Ann. 1993) (replacing CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 229.40).
41. See, e.g., id. § 9204 (replacing § 229.50); N.V PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4138-c, 4138d (McKinney Supp. 1993).
42. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 9204 (West Ann. 1993) (replacing § 229.50); N.V
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4138-c, 4138-d (McKinney Supp. 1993) ("Any employee of the department or any employee of an authorized agency who solicits or causes another to
solicit a registation ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .").
43. Hollinger. supra note 11, at 13-41.
44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1993).
45. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at app. 13-A (Supp. 1992) for a complete list of
these states.
46. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1993); ALA. CODE § 2610A-31(j) (1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-304 (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.433
(West Supp. 1993).
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cause."·7
Neither the "good cause" nor the "mutual consent" variations of statutory change have satisfied adoptees in their quest
for information about their backgrounds, for today adoptees
challenge these statutes more adamantly than ever. 48 Adoptee
activists demand legislative reform, for they feel that these statutes do not adequately address their psychological needs or their
constitutional rights.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Adoptees argue that the sealed records statutes are unconstitutiona1. 49 They contend that denying them access to these
records abridges their constitutional rights to privacy, to receive
important information, and to equal protection of the law. &0
They base the right to privacy argument on Supreme Court
cases which recognize a right to privacy emanating from the penumbra of express guarantees of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments which apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. &1 Adoptees specifically argue that, because
47. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 19-8-23 (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.433 (West Supp.
1993).
48. "[TJhe roster of search self-help organizations throughout the
country carries more than 200 entries with names such as
Adoptees as Adults, Adoptees in Search, Concerned United
Birthparents, Lost and Found, Truth Seekers in Adoption,
and Yesterday's Children. A handful have chapters in more
than one state. . . . Many are joined in loose affiliation under
the umbrella of the American Adoption Congress. New groups
regularly form; a few dissolve sporadically." AIGNER (Faint
Trails), supra note 23, at 8.
49. See, e.g., ALMA Society v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979); Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 904 (1978); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples,
563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
50. See, e.g., Yesterday's Children, 569 F.2d 431; Mills, 372 A.2d 646; In re Roger
B., 418 N.E.2d 751; Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d 1225. Adoptees
have based a fourth constitutional argument on the Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Adoptees argue that this prohibition extends to
"badges or incidents" of slavery, and severing the parental-child relationship is one of
the incidents the framers of the amendment intended to address. Id. at 1236-37.
51. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Roe expressed the right
of privacy as a "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life [in-
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the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends
protection to an individual's right to privacy within family relationships,62 it must also protect an individual's right to know his
or her true identity.1I3 Thus, adoptees contend that they have a
fundamental right to know the identities of their biological parents, for such information is necessary to achieve their own identity development. II.
Adoptees also rely on the First Amendment right to receive
information as a challenge to the sealed records statutes. 1I1I They
assert that denying them access to their original birth records
interferes with their right of freedom to participate in and contribute to social and governmental decision-making processes. liS
To develop into integrated, healthy people capable of intelligent
participation, adoptees argue that they need access to information that will contribute to their self-fulfillment.1I7 Because the
information adoptees desire will enhance their sense of identity
and therefore their ability to participate intelligently, adoptees
eluding] the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or
beget a child." Id. at 169-70.
52. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (right of privacy ineludes married couples'
use of contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (unmarried person has a right to use contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (woman has a right to
terminate her pregnancy). See also Cythia A. Rucker, Texas Adoption Laws and
Adoptees' Right of Access to Confidential Records, 15 ST. MARY's L. J. 153, 162 n.42
(1983) (listing various other Supreme Court decisions which have recognized areas within
the family relationship that are protected by the right of privacy).
53. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 650; Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762; ALMA Society, 601
F.2d at 1231; Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 753.
54. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1231; Mills, 372 A.2d at 650. Because of
the necessary interrelationship between the individuals' identity and their fundamental
decision-making, adoptees argue that the right to privacy must also protect the individuals' control over the development of identity. "II]t is difficult ... to separate a person's
identity from his choices in fundamental relationships. The core of his identity is indeed
more private than his role as a parent or as a sexual partner, and any interference with
its development necessarily affects his private decisions." Carolyn Burke, Note, The
Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Rights to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196,
1208 (1975).
55. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 652; Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762; Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at
752.
56. 'Kathryn J. Giddings, The Current Status of the Right of Adult Adoptees to
Know the Identity of their Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U. L. Q. 677, 689 (1980); Burke,
supra note 54, at 1204-05. "To the extent it is true that only people who have developed
fully and healthily are capable of intelligent decisionmaking, the protection of the First
Amendment would seem to extend to information which affects that development, even
though unrelated to any particular societal decision." Id. at 1205.
57. Burke, supra note 54, at 1205.
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maintain that the right to receive information must protect their
access to their original birth records. liS
The equal protection argument arises from the fact that
non-adoptees can readily access their birth records. lIo Adoptees
argue that the adopted status shares the same burdensome characteristics that have made illegitimacy a "quasi-suspect class";6o
thus, legislation which discriminates against them should be
subject to heightened scrutiny.61 Adoptees assert that the sealed
records statutes would fail a heightened scrutiny test because
they do not advance an important or compelling state interest.611
No federal or state court has accepted these constitutional
challenges. 6s Although recognizing that adoptees have a general
right to privacy and to receive information, the courts have rejected the argument that adoptees have a fundamental right to
learn the identities of their biological parents. 64 The courts
maintain that no constitutional or personal right is unconditional and absolute to the exclusion of the rights of all other
58. 1d. at 1205-06.
59. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 652; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233; Maples, 563

S.W.2d at 764.
60. Leslie Allan, Confirming the Constitutionality 01 Sealing Adoption Records:
ALMA Society v. Mellon, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 717, 731 (1980). Adoptees argue:
Because most adoptees are illegitimate, legislation differentiating adoptees as a class should be given at least the same
level of judicial scrutiny as that affecting illegitimates ....
[T]he state treats adoptees less favorably than it treats illegitimates by denying adoptees the knowledge of their natural
parents' identities; therefore, legislation affecting adoptees
should be given more rigorous scrutiny than that given to legislation which affects illegitimates.
1d.
61. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 653; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233; Maples, 563
S.W.2d at 764.
62. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233; Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 764; Roger B.,
418 N.E.2d at 756.
62. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-44.
64. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 650. "[W]hile information regarding the heritage,
background and physical and psychological heredity of any person is essential to that
person's identity and self-image, nevertheless it is not so intimately personal as to fall
within the zones of privacy implicitly protected in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights."
1d. See also Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 754; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233. The ALMA
court refused to simply hold that because adoptees' interests in knowing the identities of
their biological parents does not fall within the recognized categories of "privacy", it is
not constitutionally protected. Rather, the court analyzed the asserted right in light of
the social context in determining the right is not fundamental. 1d. at 1231-33.
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.individuals. 611 The right to privacy arid to information asserted
by adoptees directly conflicts with the right to privacy of birth
parents to be left alone. 66 Due to these conflicting interests, the
sealed records statutes are upheld because they bear a rational
relationship to the permissible state objective of protecting the
integrity of the adoption process. 67 Although the adoptee may no
longer need the state's protection upon reaching adulthood,
courts state that the birth parents' interest in confidentiality
may actually become stronger. 66
Courts have also rejected the equal protection argument. 69
Court.s state that the adopted status does not share the burdensome characteristics that have made illegitimacy a quasi-suspect
class;70 thus, classification based on the adopted status does not
require intermediate or strict scrutiny.71 Even assuming that the
adopted status classification was subject to intermediate review,
courts maintain that the sealed records statutes would still not
violate the equal protection clause because the statutes are substantially related to an important state interest.72 Moreover,
65. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 652; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233.
66. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1231; Mills, 372 A.2d at 651; Roger B., 418
N.E.2d at 755-56.
67. See, e.g., Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762-64; Mills, 372 A.2d at 651-52. The sealed
records statutes represent the legislative judgment that confidentiality promotes the welfare of all parties to the adoption relationship. Adoptees benefit from the removal of the
illegitimacy stigma. Adoptive parents and birth parents benefit from the freedom of possible intrusion in the future. Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 754-55.
68. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 651 (stating that it is highly likely that the birth parent
has established new relationships and chosen not to reveal the facts of such an emotional
experience that occurred in the past). See also Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 755-56; ALMA
Society, 601 F.2d at 1235-36.
69. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 653-54; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233-36; Roger
B., 418 N.E.2d at 756-57.
70. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 653. "An adoptee does not derive [the adopted status)
from an accident of birth but as a result of a legal proceeding which has as the very
essence of its purpose the protection of the adoptee's best interest." [d. See also ALMA
Society, 601 F.2d at 1234 (stating that the distinguishing trait between adult adoptees
and non-adopted illegitimates is not illegitimacy, but the adopted status). "Discrimination against illegitimates is generally so treated because of the illogic and injustice of
stigmatizing a child in order to express disapproval of the parents' liasons .... If
adopted persons experience social stigma, it is not as intense or pervasive as illegitimates
suffer." [d.
71. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 653; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1234; Roger B., 418
N.E.2d at 756.
72. ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1234; Mills, 372 A.2d at 653 ("The state has more
than a rational basis, it has a compelling interest."). See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative purposes behind sealed records statutes.
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courts note that the "good cause" provisions allowing for the release of adoption records substantially mitigates the possible
overbreath of the statutes. 7S
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the sealed records controversy, it is highly unlikely
adoptees will ever establish a constitutional right of access to
their birth records. 7• Thus, the strongest possibility for further
open access to birth records lies in legislative reform. 711 Adoptees
must persuade their state legislatures to reevaluate the interests
involved in light of present day social mores. By forcing their
respective legislatures to take a closer look at the sealed records
controversy, adoptees can demonstrate that the need for stateimposed secrecy no longer exists.
V. CHANGING VIEWS ABOUT SECRECY
The "sealed records" policy in adoption served adoptees,
birth parents, and adoptive parents extremely well at a time
when society was not generally well-accepting of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies or single parent families. 78 The public not only accepted the closure of records but demanded such a policy.77 Society has changed a great deal since sealed records first became
widely accepted as the perfect solution to a complex problem. 78
73. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1236; Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 757.
74. See, e.g., Allan, supra note 60, at 726; Michael J. Hanley, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, 2 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 542, 549-50
(1975).

75. See, e.g., Handley, supra note 74, at 552; Carter, supra note 7, at 852·53.
76. See, e.g., Task Force on Confidentiality in the Adoption Program, A REPORT TO
THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH. July, 1977, at 1; ELINOR B. ROSENBERG. THE
ADOPTION LIFE CYCLE 1-2 (1992). Rosenberg states:
[A]doption of children was commonly thought to be the perfect solution to a myriad of problems: birth parents who chose
to continue a pregnancy but could not raise their child could
expect the child to be well cared for and supported; infertile
couples who longed for a child were able to fulfill their wishes
for a family; fertile couples who chose to enlarge their families
while meeting a social need could do so; children who needed
parents were provided with a welcome home; and child welfare
agents in the legal, social, and medical systems were able to
offer a solution that, for once, was opposed by no one.
[d.
77. REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 76. at 1.
78. ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 10.
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The sexual revolution of the 1960's, changes in the social situation of women in relation to sex and parenthood, changing attitudes about illegitimacy, the availability of contraceptives, and
the legitimization of abortion have all contributed to changing
views about the confidentiality of birth records. 79 At the same
time, some of the basic social and psychological beliefs that supported the "as if"80 quality of the adoption system began to
change. 81 These shifts have altered the concept of adoption as a
perfect solution and raised many questions about existing adoption practices. 82
Today, people who study adoption realize that while confidentiality is in the best interests of adoptees as children, this
does not always hold true for adoptees who have reached adulthood. 83 Moreover, many biological and adoptive parents have vocalized that confidentiality is not in their best interests either.84
Surely a few members of the adoption triad oppose disclosure;
nevertheless, the interests of these participants must be balanced against the overwhelming majority of members who
strongly support openness. The interests of a small minority in
secrecy should not impose secrecy on everyone else.
A.

THE ADOPTEES' BEST INTERESTS

A common complaint of adult adoptees is that society continues to treat them as "children," and they are never allowed to
grow Up.811 Adoption legislation forgets that what is in adoptees'
79. See id.; John Triseliotis, Obtaining Birth Certificates, in ADOPTION 43, (Philip
Bean ed. 1984).
80. It was as if the birth mother had never borne the child, and as if the adoptive
mother had. ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 10.
81. "One important shift was away from the belief in the predominance of nurture
over nature as an influence on individual development .... New information about
genetic structure and heredity shifted this view so that both nature and nurture were
seen as influential, the balance different between each individual." Id.
82. See id. at 11.
83. See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 112-130 and accompanying text.
85. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 121. The authors mention how an adoption agency
refused to release background information to a forty-year-old adoptee. The agency administrator informed the woman that she would need to obtain permission from her seventy-six-year-old adoptive mother. Id. at 122. The authors also quote an adoptee as
saying:
In a way, I am very angry at the law. The law still refers to me
as a child when they refer to "in the best interests of the
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best interests as children may no longer be so once they have
reached adulthood. 86 Adoptees argue that they no longer need
the state's protection as adults, for they are quite capable of deciding what is in their best interests. 87
The limited research88 on adult adoptees suggests that they
often suffer from identity crises 89 due to a lack of knowledge
about their origins. 90 The ignorance of their true genealogical
child." I resent that because in my opinion, I am twenty-one
years old and I feel I am quite old enough, mature and responsible enough to be making my own decisions. I don't feel as if
any decision concerning my life should be left up to a judge or
anyone else.
[d. at 121.
86. See Patricia Gallagher Lupack, Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: the Need
for Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAWYER 211, 217 (1975).
87. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 146. The authors quote an adoptee as
stating:
No one, no social worker ha[s) the right to decide for me what
I should know about me. If I don't like what I find out, that's
my problem. I'm an adult in every other way, and I make my
own decisions about what risks I take, and I face the consequences, too.
[d.
88. Although much research exists on adoption, Betty Jean Lifton mentions that
there has been very little research on adopted adults. She suggests that this lack of research reflects society's difficulty in thinking of the adoptee who has reached adulthood.
BETTY JEAN LIFTON, LOST & FOUND 63 (1988). Hal Aigner suggests that because secrecy
has imposed limited access to adoptees, birth parents, and adoptive parents as study
subjects, much of the research about the adoptive experience may be considered of dubious value at best. AIGNER (Coming of Age), supra note 15, at 19.
89. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 14. The authors state that an adoptee:
[I)gnorant of his/her true background, despite a healthy, nurturing relationship with his/her adoptive parents and a lack of
severe problems in his/her relationships with peers and others,
will be handicapped in the psychohistorical dimension of identity . . . . The psychohistorical dimension includes that part
of man's identity that relates to his/her sense of genealogy, an
existential concern that views man as going through a cycle of
life stages which are connected to the previous and future generations through the phenomena of birth and death.
[d. See generally Paul Sachdev, Unlocking the Adoption Files: A Social and Legal Dilemma, ADOPTION: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS 141, 142-46 (Sachdev, ed. 1984) (discussing various studies which indicate the identity problems which adoptees face).
90. See, e.g., Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143. Sachdev states:
While all children during their adolescence experience in varying degrees the problems of identity formation, adopted adolescents are particularly vulnerable to interference with the
development of their self-identity because of their sense of
deprivation of "rootedness" and linkage with their biological
past.
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background causes many adoptees to feel a deeply-rooted psychological need to learn the identities of their birth parents. Bl
The fact that adoptees have two sets of parents can complicate
the formation of their self-identities because this fact seems to
set adoptees apart from the vast majority of people, including
their adoptive family.B2 Thus, the search for origins can have a
beneficial effect on adoptees' sense of identity.Bs Even when
adoptees are disappointed by what they discover, they can still
benefit from learning the truth. B4
Evidence exists that adoptees make up a disproportionately
high percentage of psychiatric patients in the United States. BII
Some adoptees fear the possibility of incest with an unknown
biological relative. Bs Many adoptees concern themselves with the
hereditary and genetic aspects of illness, physical features, and
life span. B7 They experience further frustration for not being
able to pass this information on to their own children. Bs Some
adult adoptees appear to suffer from low self-esteem and seem
to be angry at the world which has withheld knowledge of their
birthright from them. BB Adoptees have used this research as am[d. As identity formation is a life-long process, adoptees' need to know their origins continues into adulthood. Burke, supra note 54, at 1202. Betty Jean Lifton speaks of the
adoptive adult as "the child now grown, although it is hard to know where one ends and
the other begins." LIFTON, supra note 88, at 62.
. 91. See JOHN TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS 154 (1973).
92. Burke, supra note 54, at 1201. "In addition, the adoptee is totally deprived of
that sense of what makes his family unique which would come simply from observing
and talking with his natural parents." [d.
93. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 54, at 1203; Sachdev, supra note 89, at 145; TRIBELIOTIS, supra note 91, at 139. Triseliotis mentions various comments of adoptees after
conducting searches including: "knowing where 1 stand", being "more at peace with myselr', "contented", "much happier", "having bridged the gap". [d.
94. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 54, at 1203; TRISELIOTIB, supra note 91, at 140.
95. See, e.g., SOROSKY supra note 18, at 96; ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 118.
96. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 113; SOROSKY supra note 18, at 124.
Sorosky et al. mention one case where a young man brought his fiancee home to meet his
parents. Upon looking at the young woman and learning that she was adopted, the
mother became immediately uncomfortable. "It didn't take too long for her to determine
that this was the grown-up version of the child she had relinquished for adoption twenty
years earlier." [d.
97. [d. at 126. See also Jackie Weber, 'Who Am !?'-a Basic Right, L.A. TIMES, July
7, 1990, at 7b. Weber, an adoptee, asks "WHO AM I? 1 still don't know. At 22, 1 don't
know whose nose I have, my genealogy, my family medical history, why 1 weighed about
as much as a cantaloupe at birth. These are gaping holes in my life." [d.
98. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 128.
99. [d. at 130. See also ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 112. Rosenberg quotes an
adoptee as wondering:
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munition in their court petitions to show good cause for release
of their birth records. loo However, courts have rarely enabled
adoptees to open their records based on a thinly supported psychological need. lol
Ample evidence exists in the literature to suggest that
adoptees' desire to know their biological roots is not an idle curiosity of individuals who are psychologically and socially impaired. l02 These writers contend that this psychological need is a
nearly universal phenomenon in normal personality development. lOS The adoptee's compelling need for his or her true identity is an undeniable basic human need to know one's true place
in history.lo. The intensity of this desire no doubt varies with
each individual; some adoptees may have an apparent disinterest in seeking knowledge about or contact with their biological
parents; others may manifest their interest more
compulsively. 1011
Whether the need to search for one's origins is viewed as the
result of psychological impairment or a normal curiosity about
one's genealogy, the current literature on adoption demonstrates
that the sealed records statutes are not in the best interests of
many adult adoptees. loe Current state laws do not adequately
address adoptees' need for information about their background.
Who am I? What do I present to the world out there as I explore intimate relationships and work? Am I really a college
graduate prepared for a professional life like my adoptive parents or have I just been groomed to look like one? Sometimes
I feel like a total fraud and that I am really an auto mechanic
dressed up to look like a lawyer.
ld.

100. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 38.
102. Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143.
103. See Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143 (listing these authors).
104. See, e.g., SOROSKY supra note 18, at 139 (citing Margaret Lawrence who had
interviewed two hundred adult adoptees); Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143 (citing the
same study). See a/so In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (Seiler, J.,
concurring) ("All of us need to know our past, not only for a sense of lineage and heritage, but for a fundamental and crucial sense of our very selves: our identity is incomplete and our sense of self retarded without a real personal historical connection.").
105. Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143-44 (citing Margaret Lawrence). See supra note
104.
106. Carolyn Burke suggests that whatever adoptees' reasons for searching out their
identity, the fact that they attempt to do so despite the current legislation serves as
testimony to the depth of their need to know. Burke, supra note 54, at 1202-03.
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THE BIRTH PARENTS' INTERESTS

The sealed records statutes purport to protect the birth parents'lO'7 right of privacy.l08 State legislatures and courts base this
view on the traditional assumption that birth parents want to
sever all ties with their adoptee and forget about the entire experience. l09 Proponents of sealed birth records maintain that
birth parents continue to rely on past assurances of anonymity
to protect themselves against intrusions by the children they
gave up for adoption. 110
State legislatures should reevaluate the traditional assumptions in light of the changed social context and studies which
demonstrate the inaccuracy of these assumptions. I I I With the
advent of activist organizations such as Concerned United
Birthparents (CUB),112 birth parents are increasingly revealing
107. The ensuing discussion of birth parents' interests occasionally refers specifically to birth mothers because they actually bore the adoptee. Moreover, the majority of
the author's sources referred specifically to the experiences of birth mothers after giving
up their adoptee. Nevertheless, this discussion applies to birth fathers as well. See, e.g.,
Dear Abby, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 1994, at E8. Abby prints the letter of a birth father who
writes:
We are always reading about unwed mothers who give up their
children for adoption. What about the fathers of these children? I am the father of a baby boy born out of wedlock. I
would give my right arm to have raised that child, but I had
no say in the matter; he was given to strangers who adopted
him.
Id.
108. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1386 (R.I. 1986); Bradey v.
Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981).
109. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 651.
110. See id. See also On the Confidentiality of Adoption Records, NATIONAL COMMITI'EE FOR ADOPTION 2 (on file with the National Committee for Adoption, Wash. D.C.).
111. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 53 (reporting eighty-two percent of birth
parents said they were interested in a reunion with adoptee); Adoption: A Life Long
Process, REPORT OF THE ADOPTION TASK FORCE. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES.
March 1989, at 17. None of the 130 birth parents polled were adverse to a reunion with
their adoptee. Five percent of the adoptees and two percent of the adoptive parents were
adverse to a reunion. Id. See also REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH.
supra note 76. at 32 (citing a study of the Children's Home Society of California which
found that eighty-two percent of the 102 birth parents polled supported the right of
adult adoptees to have access to their original birth certificates and that eighty-nine percent of adoptees and seventy-three percent of adoptive parents supported this access as
well).Id.
112. CUB is a nonprofit organization that advocates the opening of adoption records
to adoptees and recommends an acceptance of two sets of parents, similar to stepparent
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that the sealed records statutes are not in their best interests
either.ll8
Birth parents express that the adoption agencies advised
them to pretend the adoptee does not exist and assured them
that they would forget the entire experience, but they never actually do.u" Many birth mothers experience emotional conflicts
such as anger, grief, guilt, and depression as an aftermath of
adoption. m Many wish they had never given up their child. 118
Others wish they could explain to the adoptee their reason for
choosing adoption. 117
and foster home arrangements. CUB espouses a primary goal of avoiding unnecessary
adoptions and keeping biological families together. ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 11.
l13. See Sachdev, supra note 89, at 149. See generally SOROSKY, supra note 18, at
47-72 (discussing the feelings of various birth parents).
l14. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 58. The authors quote a birth mother as saying:
1 was told 1 would forget-nonsense. That 1 would get over it;
other children would help me forget this child. These empty
promises and pat theories of social workers simply have no basis in reality, no basis in the feelings of natural mothers who
have been through this devastating experience.
Id. See also Leslie Dreyfous, Dead Ends, Red Tape Mark One Birth Mother's Search for
Son, L.A. TIMES, November 29, 1992, at 1A ("I was told that I'd forget the experience,
that I'd have other children and go on with life. What happened is I've never had other
children, and I've never forgotten the experience.").
l15. Sachdev, supra note 89, at 149. See also Mary McGrory, Adoption's Last
Anguish, WASH. POST, July 8,1990, at C1 ("They tell you that you will put it all behind
you and get on with your life. But it gnaws at you constantly. They do not prepare you
for the pain. You are made to feel responsible to make some childless couple happy.");
ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 168. Rosenberg states that some birth mothers say they
accepted the idea that they would put the pain of the relinquishment behind them and
go on with successful lives; instead, they have experienced a lifetime of grieving and
regret. Id.
l16. Many birth parents feel that had they been offered financial and emotional
support, they would have been able to raise the child themselves. "They blame opinionated social workers and families for forcing them into the belief that adoption was the
best option for them and for their child." ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 168.
l17. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 62. The authors quote a biological mother
as saying:
1 was a mother who gave up her rights, but not her feelings,
about the daughter she gave up for adoption. 1 would like her
to know that 1 didn't give her up because 1 didn't want her, or
love her. 1 wanted her to have something 1 couldn't give her at
the time that she needed it most.
Id. The authors also mention a biological mother who says:
1 gave up a male child for adoption thirteen years ago . . . . 1
want to explain to him why he was given up for adoption and
to help him to know that he was not rejected by me. 1 was
raped and know little about the father; still 1 feel that my
child has a right to know the truth.
.
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The traditional assumption was that opening birth records
would subject many birth parents who are found by their
adoptees to renewed fears of guilt or shame. However, for a majority of birth parents, the reunion experience provides an opportunity to resolve old feelings of guilt and erase years of questions about the fate of their relinquished child. u8 Even those
birth parents who are originally adverse to a reunion with the
adoptee often change their minds after being contacted, for they
realize the healing effect from discarding the veil of secrecy.ll9
There remain a few birth parents who undoubtedly want to
retain their anonymity and would definitely not welcome a reunion. 120 For these parents, the reappearance of a child given up
years before could be potentially disruptive or even devastating.
However, the feelings of these birth parents must be weighed
against the strong desire for openness held by searching
adoptees and the overwhelming majority of birth parents. The
current statutes allow the desire for secrecy held by a small minority to impose secrecy on everyone else.

C.

THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS' INTERESTS

Sealed records protect the interests of adoptive parents
from unwanted intrusion. 121 Adoptive parents should be able to
raise the adoptee without the fear of interference from the birth
parents.122 Many adoptive parents fear that liberalization of the
sealed records statutes could lead to the loss of their adoptive
[d. at 63.
118. See generally SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 157-96.
119. See LIFTON, supra note 88, at 115 (describing how it is not uncommon for birth
mothers to deny they are the right person when first contacted). "Taken by surprise, she
needs time to work through her emotions before she is able to reopen this painful and
often secret part of her life." [d.
120. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 70. The authors quote a birth mother as saying:
I had an illegitimate child when I was nineteen. No one knew
about it except my parents. Three years later I got married.
My husband has no idea of my past nor will he be told. I now
have a prestigious job, a child and a lovely home. I am thirty
years of age. I'm afraid that if the child ever came to my front
door it would be the end of my marriage. My husband would
probably get custody of our child.
[d.
121. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J.
Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
122. [d.
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child to his or her birth parents. 12S Often, they interpret an
adoptee's interest in his or her birth parents as an indication of
their failure as parents. 124
The continuing enlightenment about adoption as a life long
process will enable many adoptive parents to understand and
overcome their traditional fears.12II The literature on the needs
of adoptees regarding their genealogical identity explains to
adoptive parents that an adoptee's interest in his or her biological parents is not an indication of parental failure. 126 Furthermore, many adoptive parents find that their relationships with
their adoptees improve after a reunion with the adoptees' biological parents.127 Once an adoptee can put aside his or her fan123. See, e.g., Terry Brick, Letters to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1990, at lOB
(discussing how open records statutes would reduce adoptive parents to uncompensated
foster parents). Brick, an adoptive parent, states:
The decision to adopt is not one that a couple makes lightly
and usually comes after years of trying to conceive a child of
their own. Adoption is a way of filling those dreams one has
for one's life; however, under [an open records statute] one
would only fill those dreams for 18 years, then the "real parent" comes back on the scene. Not a very happy prospect. Frequent articles about adoptees finding birth parents never mention the devastation this can bring to the adoptive parents
who have spent a lifetime treating this child as their own, only
to have it turn against them.
Jd.

124. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 73.
125. Jd. at 15. The authors state:
Parenthood (adoptive or biological) is a psychological phenomenon based upon the growth of love and mutual respect
between parent and child. . . . [T]he true "psychological parent" is the mother or father who has nurtured the child during
the developmental years. This relationship can never be seriously endangered by outside persons or influences. If the
adoptive parents can understand the primary importance of
their role, ... they will not feel threatened by the implications of opening the sealed records.
Jd.

126. See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
127. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 16. Aigner states:
[R]eunifications not only pose no ha2ard to adoptive families,
they may instead strengthen the ties that bind. Reasons cited
for this begin with the fact that an adoptive family is in place,
grounded in shared experience, and has affections and a history that are not voided by a reunification anymore than a
marriage. In addition, a search commonly prompts adoptees to
contemplate, perhaps for the first time, the meaning of their
familial relationships. Being found often has the same effect.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/9

20

Kuhns: Sealed Adoption Records

SEALED ADOPTION RECORDS

1994]

279

tasies about their biological parents, a greater sense of appreciation for adoptive parents is finally possible.u8
Accepting the reality that their adopted children may feel
compelled to search for their birth parents is difficult for adoptive parents. Nevertheless, an increasing number of adoptive
parents now understand that if their adoptee wants to search for
his or her birth parents, they should support this decision. 129
Most adoptive parents realize they adopted because they wanted
the chance to parent, not because they were promised
confidentiality. ISO
Such contemplation commonly leads to a deeper appreciation
of what there is to value. Finally, as adoptees finally put to
rest the frequently disquieting questions of their heredity, why
they were relinquished, and the like, the satisfactions they derive from the answers tend to have beneficial consequences for
all of their relationships.
[d.
128. See AIGNER (Coming of Age), supra note 15, at 188. Aigner describes how the
potential for an adoptee-birth parent reunification to strengthen an adoptive family is
nowhere more fully illuminated than during occasions at search workshops when
adoptees who have recently completed their quests tell of the ups and downs of their
own adventures. Aigner states:
In these moments of highly charged sentimentality, a point is
often reached in which adoptees will look to their adoptive
parents and, in voices choking with emotion and with tears in
their eyes, thank them for the affection, trust, and support
shown during the search. In this exceptionally public setting,
usually before a gathering comprised, for the most part, of
strangers, these adoptees are avowing to their parents that,
"When my need was great, you were there and I love you."
For these adoptive parents, their share in the rewards of
searching comes, in part, from knowing that life with their
sons and daughters has been enriched by the experience.
[d.

129. See, e.g., Bill Blanning, Unsealing the Past, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1983, at
Section: Living. An adoptive father of four children states of adoptees, "They're not
pieces of furniture. They have their own lives." The adoptive mother adds, "We feel they
have a right to their heritage .... We're not threatened. Our relationship [with the son
who found his mother] has not changed." [d.
130. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 86. The authors quote an adoptive mother. as
saying:
I will not feel threatened or hurt if [the adoptee] should decide to seek out his birth parents. When he became our son,
we wanted no guarantees that he would accept us forever, with
never a thought of the people who gave him life. We only
wanted to love him and have the privilege of sustaining and
nurturing that life. He has another "mother" somewhere, but I
am his Mother. He will have no memories of her-she was not
there to comfort him when he was sick . . . . She will not be
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No doubt quite a few adoptive parents exist who clearly oppose open records and insist that they would not have adopted
without the promise of confidentiality.181 Although this position
is justifiable while the adoptee is a minor, the adoptee eventually grows up. Upon reaching majority, adoptive parents no
longer have legal control over their adoptee. Thus, arguably,
adoptive parents should not be able to control adult adoptees'
access to this information. Moreover, if permanent confidentiality is the determinative factor in a potential parent's decision to
adopt, the author posits the question whether these people
should adopt in the first place. 182
VI. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Current statutory approaches to the sealed records controversy are inadequate in light of the changing views about sethere for his first day of school or his graduation. Even if our
son should some day meet his birth parents, why should I feel
threatened? If he should become friends with them, or grow to
love them, it would not diminish the relationship that we
share with him. Love for one individual does not diminish because we also love another individual. If knowing and loving
his birth parents would give our son more security and happiness, we would welcome the opportunity for him. We love
him-his happiness will make us happy.
[d. at 80-81. See also Patty Lanoue Stearns, Mother, Where Are You? Adoptee's 17- Year
Quest Brings Only Dead Ends, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 18, 1992, at 1D. Stearns
quotes an adoptive mother regarding her daughter's search for her biological mother as
saying, "I don't have any hard feelings .... She gave me something I couldn't have
.... I'd like to meet [the biological mother] myself." [d.
131. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 83. The authors quote an adoptive parent as
saying:
If we had known that there was a possibility of the records
being opened, we never would have adopted. We did not adopt
our children to be caretakers or baby sitters for the natural
mothers who gave them up for adoption. We adopted because
we were granted total anonymity, and we feel that promise
must be honored.
[d.

132. Because adoption agencies attempt to procure the "best interests" of the
adoptee in placing children with adoptive parents, the agencies extensively screen potential parents. If confidentiality is still consequential to adoptive parents after their
adoptee reaches adulthood, the author suggests that the adoptive parents might be considering adoption mainly for self-seeking reasons rather than the adoptee's best interests.
Thus, the author suggests that adoption agencies should hesitate to place children with
these families simply because the adoption process can be quite difficult even when the
focus is primarily on the best interests of the adoptee.
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crecy.lSS Although most states provide for the release of nonidentifying information lS4 on demand, inaccuracy and out-ofdate information continue to plague this process. lSII The statutory provisions allowing adoptees access to identifying information under special circumstances are inadequate as well. These
"good cause" statutes fail to truly balance the competing interests involved. lsB Although some statutes have "mutual consent"
provisions which can potentially relieve adoptees from demonstrating good cause, these mechanisms also fail to address
adoptees' needs. Many birth parents simply are not aware they
can consent to the release of the original birth records. ls7 Where
consent is refused, the states simply force adoptees to face the
pitfalls of the "good cause" standard. lsB
A.

THE

DEFICIENCIES

OF

"GOOD

CAUSE"

AND

"CONSENT"

STATUTES

States have not consistently applied the "good cause" standard which adoptees must meet to obtain their original birth
records. ls9 This standard fails to provide adoptees with guidelines as to what they must allege and prove to demonstrate the
133. See supra notes 76·132 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 29 for a general list of non· identifying, background information
kept by states.
135. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13·16. Lack of diligence by investigators in ques·
tioning biological parents, or their good faith failures to ask about certain conditions not
generally known at the time to be a cause of concern (e.g., AIDS) contributes to this
inaccuracy. Furthermore, biological parents may only have limited information about
their own physical, psychological or genetic characteristics, or they may simply be reluc·
tant to disclose what they do know about each other. [d.
136. See, e.g., Arndt, supra note 39, at 120; Hanley, supra note 74, at 544; Sparks,
supra note 10, at 589.
137. See infra notes 148·149 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 33·38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the good
cause standard. See infra notes 139·145 and accompanying test for a discussion of the
inadequacies of this standard.
139. Variations of the good cause statutes are found in many states. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9·9·506(c) (Michie 1991) (good cause demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14·15·16 (Supp. 1993) (good cause shown by demonstrat·
ing that disclosure will not result in any substantial harm to biological parent); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36·1 131(a) (Supp. 1993) (good cause requires a showing that it is in the
best interest of the child or the public); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a·754 (West 1993) (good
cause demonstrated by health or medical reasons); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9:437 (West
1991) (good cause by a showing of compelling reasons); MINN. STAT. § 259.49(3) (West
1992) (good cause established by a showing that disclosure would be of greater benefit
than nondisclosure).
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requisite necessity.140 Even where guidelines exist to aid a court
in deciding whether the adoptee has demonstrated good cause,
the court must still make a case-by-case determination. l4l However, courts cannot balance the real, present needs of adoptees
against the theoretical needs of birth parents on a case-by-case
basis.142 Because the biological parents will never stand before
the court, the court must determine their desires conjecturally.143 Courts will invariably presume that birth parents oppose
disclosure.H 4 Courts then typically decide that the adoptee's interest is not as strong as that of the parents and therefore deny
disclosure. Thus, the states' failure to ascertain the actual position of birth parents prevents many adoptees from access to
their records even though the birth parents would not object. l411
"Mutual consent" statutes also fail to achieve an acceptable
balance of interests. Although they eliminate the necessity of
demonstrating good cause where a birth parent's consent is on
file, the same inadequacies of "good cause" statutes exist without this consent. HS Adoptees are forced to confront the inconsistent and theoretical balance of a "good cause" determination
that weighs heavily against them. 147 Furthermore, because mutual consent registries are generally not well publicized,H8 many
birth parents are unaware they exist. H9 Thus, requiring their af140. Arndt, supra note 39, at 119; Carter, supra note 7, at 853. See also Paul J.
Tartanella, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the
Natural Parent, RUTGERS L. REV. 451. 477 (describing how evaluation of the adoptee's
psychological problems presents practical difficulties beyond these interpretative inconsistencies). "Courts generally lack the knowledge necessary to determine the adoptee's
psychiatric needs. Psychologists may be able to distinguish curiosity from true mental
distress, yet, admitting such evidence invites a battle of the experts speculating on a
subject about which the courts have very little expertise." Id.
141. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-22 to 13-23.
142. See Arndt, supra note 39, at 119.
143. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Mich. App. 1982).
144. See, e.g., id.; Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
145. Arndt, supra note 39, at 119.
146. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., R. Bruce Dold, Adoption Registry Makes Tiny Splas/i, CHI. TRIll.,
Dec. 30, 1986, at Cl (discussing the ineffectiveness of the Illinois Adoption Registry).
The registry had matched just one parent and child in its two years of existence. Dold
states, "The registry has operated in virtual anonymity, with no budget for publicity and
a state directive that limits the release of information." Id.
149. Arndt, supra note 39, at 122. The mutual consent registries are passive in the
sense that agencies are prohibited from assisting adoptees in actively searching for their
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firmative action to register consent prevents possible consensual
reunions from taking place. lllo Some birth parents may have refused to give consent at the time of adoption but subsequently
changed their minds. Nevertheless, mutual consent registries do
not attempt to ascertain the wishes of these birth parents who
have simply not come forth on their own initiative.
Even the "search and consent" states cannot achieve a fair
balance of interests. Search and consent statutes eliminate the
defects of considering birth parents' interests conjecturallyllil
and the inadequate publicity of mutual consent statutes. llll
However, search and consent statutes cannot achieve a fair balance because they fail to weigh any interests at all. A birth parent's refusal to consent effectively ends the court's inquiry,lII3 for
the adoptee must then meet the good cause standard.lII4 Because
the birth parent has actually communicated to the court a desire
to remain anonymous, the adoptee's burden of establishing good
cause will likely be even more difficult to sustain than in a simple "good cause" system. lllll Good cause is rarely found even in
cases where no such refusal to consent is present, so presumably,
a court will find good cause even less frequently in cases of parental refusal. 1116

B.

THE DOWNSIDE TO "OPEN RECORDS" STATUTES

Adoption activists for greater disclosure advocate combirth parents. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Combined with the lack of
publicity, such a passive system precludes many birth parents from learning the existence of a registry and their option to release their consent. Hollinger. supra note 11, at
13-36. However, where adoptions have taken place since the enactment of these statutes,
adoption agencies will likely have informed birth parents of this option.
150. See Arndt, supra note 39, at 122 ("It is probable that many birth parents in
these states do not realize that their silence may mean that their child will be prevented
from seeing his records, and that they may not even be made aware of his wish to do
so.").
151. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.433(7) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that no information in the sealed records will be disclosed if the birth parent objects for any reason).
154. See, e.g., id. § 48.433(9).
155. See Arndt, supra note 39, at 123 ("It can be assumed that [the) birth parents'
refusal to consent will be given strong consideration by the court . . . . The adoptee is
again faced with all the problems of the good cause system, and his case is even further
weakened by this new factor.").
156. [d.
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pletely open records upon the adoptee's attainment of majority.
Beyond the psychological and constitutional arguments they
make,1II7 activists simply do not want judiciary involvement.1II8
They view the possibility of adoption reunions as personal matters concerning only adult adoptees and their biological parents.U19 Further, they point to the "open records" states and
countries as an indication that allowing adoptees absolute access
to their birth records is truly effective. 16o
While open records statutes would please adult adoptees
who choose to search for their birth parents, these statutes suffer the same balancing inadequacies as all the other statutes;
they specifically fail to address the interests of birth parents
who oppose disclosure. Open records make the interests of
adoptees absolute while completely disregarding any adverse interests of birth parents. Just as sealing records fails to take account of adult adoptees' interests, full disclosure wholly ignores
the interests of birth parents who adamantly oppose revealing
their identity. A truly fair birth records statute must at a minimum give these birth parents some voice.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A birth records statute that sufficiently addresses the interests of all parties involved must balance these interests within
the current social context. The statute should not presuppose
that adoptees and biological parents are adversaries in this controversy. Rather, an ideal statute would recognize that a substantial majority of members of the adoption process favor openness, and only a small minority still desire state-imposed
157. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional challenges. See supra notes 88-105 for a discussion of the psychological evidence
adoptees use in their attempt to establish "good cause" for accessing their original birth
records.
158. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 9 ("The search and reunification
movement places a great deal of emphasis on the right of adopted adults to make key
decisions affecting who they choose to regard as family.").
159. See id.
160. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 768 n.2 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (Seiler, J.,
concurring) ("I do not believe [Kansas' open records statute] would have endured this
long.if its effect were to discourage adoptions."). See also Sachdev, supra note 89, at 149
(stating that birth mothers cite the examples of Finland, Scotland, and Israel, where
adoption is practiced effectively without confidentiality statutes).
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secrecy. Activists for reform have gradually dispelled the traditional assumptions about the need for confidentiality in the
adoption process,161 and studies indicate that greater openness
would benefit all parties. 162 Thus, the time is ripe for change.
A.

MICHIGAN'S CONSENT REGISTRY

The author recommends that some form of a consent registry should accompany any statutory change short of completely
open records. Consent registries allow an adoptee or a biological
parent to bypass any court proceedings where both their consents are on file. 163 An ideal consent registry would model itself
after the registry in Michigan. 164 Michigan employs a consent
registry where biological parents take affirmative action only if
they desire to remain anonymous. 1611 Their failure to express a
desire to retain confidentiality acts as an implicit consent to the
release of identifying information. 166
161. See supra notes 76-132 and accompanying text.
162. See REPORT OF THE ADOPTION TASK FORCE, MAINE DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES,
supra note 111, at 3 ("The practice of sealing adoption records has ... contributed
negatively to emotional and psychological health issues suffered by members of the triad.
In general, 'openness' in adoption is a more sound approach .... "). See also REPORT TO
THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 76, at 27 (recommending that adult
adoptees should have access to their original birth certificate); SOROSKY, supra note 18,
at 223 (stating that adult adoptees should have access to their birth records, if they so
desire, when they reach the age of eighteen); TRISELIOTIS, supra note 91, at 166 (citing
the recommendation of a task force report covering adopted adults in England, Wales,
and Scotland which proposed that an adopted person age eighteen years or over should
be entitled to a copy of his or her original birth certificate).
163. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
164. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 710.68 (West 1993).
165. See id. The statutory change requiring biological parents to act affirmatively if
they want to prevent disclosure took effect in September of 1980:
For all adoptions in which the biological parents' rights were
terminated after September 12, 1980, an adoptee not less than
18 years of age shall have the right to obtain the identifying
information . . . and any additional information on file . . .
except that if a biological parent has filed a statement currently in effect with the department denying consent to have
identifying information released, identifying information shall
not be released about that parent.
[d. § 710.68(7).
166. See id. Because biological parents must register a formal refusal to consent if
they desire to protect their anonymity, their failure to register gives the state permission
to release this information. Thus, Michigan's mutual consent registry shifts the advantage of passivity to the adoptee by placing the burden of affirmative action on the biological parent. Arndt, supra note 39, at 126.
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Michigan's mutual consent registry is superior to those in
other states because it creates a presumption in favor of openness. Changing the procedure under which circumstances a biological parent must act affirmatively sends a clear message that
consenting to the release of the original birth records is the accepted practice. IS? If Michigan's statistics are representative of
the nation, employment of this type of registry will cause approximately eighty percent of biological parents to implicitly
consent to the release of their identities upon the adoptee's
reaching majority. ISS By not signing any form, biological parents
would be subject to the statutory presumption that they have
consented. ls9 Therefore, in most cases an adult adoptee will
never need to petition a court for the release of these records.
Nevertheless, a solution is still necessary for the situations
where a refusal of consent is on file.
Filing a denial of consent in Michigan acts as an absolute
veto, for no information will be released about that parent. no
The recommended solution would not allow the denial of a consent to act as an absolute veto; rather, filing such a denial would
simply reserve for a biological parent the right to be heard in a
court proceeding before identifying information is released to an
adoptee. Filing a statement denying consent would prohibit automatic disclosure of identifying information but would not bar
the release of this information altogether. Where the biological
parent has requested non-disclosure, states should establish
guidelines for courts that will create easier access to the sealed
records.
B.

SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A few commentators have suggested that the New Jersey
167. See Hollinger supra note 18, at 13-38 (stating that requiring biological parents
to act affirmatively shifts the adoption records policy in favor of disclosure).
168. For children born and placed for adoption in Michigan since 1980, over eighty
percent of the mothers and nearly seventy percent of the fathers have prospectively consented to the release of their identities when the child reaches adulthood. These parents
have either signed an explicit consent form or, by not signing any form, are subject to
the statutory presumption that they have consented. Hollinger. supra note 18, at 86
(Supp. 1992) (describing data provided by Michigan Dept. Soc. Serv., April 1991).
169. See id.
170. See supra note 165.
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court in Mills u. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics l7l struck
an adequate statutory balance through its interpretation of the
state's "good cause" standard.172 The Mills court upheld the
constitutionality of New Jersey's "good cause" statute against a
challenge by four adult adoptees. 173 After stating that a court
must look to the intent of a statutory law rather than simply to
its form, the court established procedural guidelines to effect its
interpretation of the state legislature's intent but more adequately protect the rights of all parties.174
The court held that while the adoptee is still a minor, the
current procedure would remain the same so that the party
seeking access has the heavy burden of demonstrating good
cause. m However, where adult adoptees seek access to their
original birth records, the burden shifts to the state to prove an
absence of good cause. 176 The court reasoned, "An adoptee who
is moved to a court proceeding . . . is impelled by a need to
know which is far deeper than 'mere curiosity.' "177 Further, the
court suggested that because the state creates the adoptive relationship, it has a duty to assist adoptees in their growth to become full and healthy members of society.178

C.

THE IMPROVIDENCE OF MILLS

The author commends the Mills court for its attempt to
maneuver around the inequities of the New Jersey "good cause"
statute at a time when society was generally more accepting of
secrecy. However, the Mills court did not go far enough. In practice, the Mills approach may not make it any easier for adult
adoptees to learn the identities of their biological parents than
171. 372 A.2d 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
172. See. e.g., Sparks, supra note 10, at 589-90; Allan, supra note 60, at 744; Arndt,
supra note 39, at 125.
173. Mills, 372 A.2d 646.
174. [d. at 654.
175. [d.
176. [d.
177. [d. at 655. The court went on to state that this compelling psychological need
may well constitute the good cause required by New Jersey's statute.
178. See id. at 656. Hollinger has interpreted the Mills holding as essentially stating, "If the state wants to prevent adoptees from learning the names of their biological
parents, it must bear the burden of showing why the petitioners' reasons are insufficient
to satisfy the statutory good cause exception." Hollinger. supra note 11, at 13-26.
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in jurisdictions where the initial burden of demonstrating good
cause remains on adoptees. 179 If the state fails to show an absence of good cause, the Mills court would appoint an intermediary to locate the biological parents and solicit their consent. ISO
Where consent is refused, the court must then weigh the
adoptee's presumed justifications for disclosure against the biological parents' desire for privacy. lSI Thus, the court must perform the same type of balancing required where the burden is
initially on the adoptee, and the procedure suffers the same inadequacies of the "search and consent" statutes. IS:! Because a biological parent could almost certainly maintain confidentiality
simply by refusing consent, this approach tilts the balance too
much in favor of secrecy. The shifting burden of proof employed
by the Mills court simply does not accomplish a true presumption in favor of openness. Thus, the Mills approach fails to actually establish a procedure that fairly addresses the competing
interests.
The inadequacies of the Mills approach aside, this decision
also lacks precedential value. Eight years after Mills, a court in
the same jurisdiction declined to follow this approach. In Backes
v. Catholic Family and Community Services,183 a New Jersey
court rejected the Mills interpretation of the state's "good
cause" statute. The Backes court held that, as written, the New
Jersey "good cause" statute requires adoptees to do more than
merely file a complaint to establish good cause. 184 Adoptees must
demonstrate some need beyond desire or curiosity before a court
should authorize contact with the biological parents. 1SII The Backes court concluded that a procedure such as suggested in Mills
should come only from the legislature. 188

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

[d.
Mills, 372 A.2d at 656.
[d.

See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
509 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
Backes, 509 A.2d at 300.
[d. at 299.
[d. at 294.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/9

30

Kuhns: Sealed Adoption Records

1994]

D.

SEALED ADOPTION RECORDS

289

EXTENDING MILLS TO ACHIEVE A TRUE PRESUMPTION OF
OPENNESS

A true presumption in favor of open records would not permit a refusal of consent to sustain a biological parent's burden of
proof. Such a presumption would require biological parents
themselves to demonstrat~ why their interest in confidentiality
outweighs society's interest in disclosure. To protect their identities, biological parents necessarily would have to establish that
their interests substantially outweigh the public policy in favor
of openness. 18? Biological parents could not sustain this burden
of proof simply by showing that disclosure would cause them inconvenience or emotional harm. Rather, courts would require
truly compelling reasons so that anonymity would remain only
in exceptional circumstances. 188 Even where a biological parent
sustained his or her burden of proof, every possible effort would
be made to alleviate this strong desire for confidentiality so a
court could still grant disclosure.1 89
Although a perfect adoption records statute is impossible to
achieve, states should attempt to find the best solution for the
greatest number of people. Changing the presumption in favor
of disclosure would achieve that goal. Were a statute to frame
the sealed records dilemma in this way, it could finally relieve
courts from the necessity of pitting adoptees against biological
parents generally when determining whether to disclose these
records. Such a statute would more accurately reflect the makeup of the actual parties to this controversy: those in favor of
candor, and those against it.
187. The court proceeding would require that the biological parents be able to make
an appearance through counsel in such a way as to protect their identities in the event
that they sustained their burden of proof.
188. The author believes that it is inappropriate to delineate what would amount to
an "exceptional circumstance." Due to the factually intensive nature of such a court proceeding, each decision would require a case-by-case determination. Nevertheless, a showing by a biological parent that the adoptee was the product of an extra-marital affair
should probably sustain that biological parent's burden of proof.
189. In the situation where the biological parent sustained his or her burden of
proof because the adoptee was the product of an extra-marital affair, a court might still
find a solution agreeable to that biological parent which would allow for disclosure. For
instance, the court might fashion a way for the adoptee to meet with the biological parent without the knowledge of that parent's spouse.
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BIOLOGICAL PARENTS SHOULD BENEFIT AS WELL

This recommendation presupposes that an adult adoptee,
not a biological parent, is attempting to open the birth records.
Where a biological parent petitions a court for access to the
sealed birth record of an adoptee, a strong case can be made
that the burden of proving good cause should remain on the
birth parent. The difference in treatment could be justified because the biological parents sign away their own legal rights at
the time of adoption while adoptees do not. Unlike birth parents, adoptees had no voice in the original adoption process.
Their birth parents, adoptive parents, and the state made this
decision for them. Regardless of any coercion some birth parents
claim to have experienced that might have driven them to give
up their child, the reality is that they did give the child away.
Thus, one might view forcing adult adoptees to affirm a contract
which they took no part in as unjust; yet arguably, the same
logic does not apply to biological parents who agreed to anonymity in the original proceeding.
Although such an argument might be justified, the author
recommends that biological parents should also benefit from the
suggested procedural change establishing a presumption of
openness. Because secrecy is the evil that this article attempts to
combat, the author suggests that the presumption in favor of
open records apply equally to biological parents and adoptees.
Such a presumption would only occur once adoptees reach
adulthood. Because adoptees maintain that they no longer need
the state's protection as adults, they should accept the risk of
being found as an incident to their individual autonomy. An
adoptee who desires to remain anonymous could still attempt to
establish that his or her interest in confidentiality substantially
outweighs the public policy in favor of openness. If the adoptee
is unsuccessful, opening the adoption records will only give biological parents identifying information. The adoptee can refuse
to meet or maintain a relationship with a biological parent just
as any other adult is free to choose with whom they associate.

F.

PROSPECTIVE CHANGE ONLY

Drawing upon the experiences of adoption participants
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helps demonstrate the changing views about secrecy and the
need for legislative reform. However, this author does not propose that statutory change be applied retroactively. The literature suggests that a statute facilitating the opening of records
retroactively would surely be in the best interests of most
adoptees and biological parents. Nevertheless, an unyielding
stance on this issue stands in the way of the necessary legislative
reform. Irrespective of the benefits retroactive legislation would
confer upon most, lobbyists cause state legislatures to shy away
from such change due to the confidentiality which birth parents
have supposedly been assured of in the past. 190 State lobbyists
insist that birth parents continue to rely on these promises,191
and these lobbyists create the fear of potential lawsuits and undesirable emotional trauma. 192 Thus, the author suggests that
adoption reform activists concede this loss and concentrate on
the attainment of prospective change. Prospective reform will at
190. See Adoption Defense Fund Enters California Legislative Battle Over Privacy
Rights For Women Who Have Placed Children For Adoption, Others Who Would Be
Victimized By Rewriting Laws Meant To Protect Confidential Decisions, ADOPTION DE'
FENSE FUND I, Aug. 10, 1990. The Adoption Defense Fund is a Washington, D.C. based
national lobbying organization which is affiliated with the National Committee For
Adoption. The Adoption Defense Fund issued a press release as a reaction to A.B. 3907.
Reg. Sess., Cal. (1989·90) which would have opened sealed adoption records in California
retroactively. The press release quotes William Pierce of the National Committee For
Adoption as stating:
Imagine what would happen if promises and guarantees made
by any segment of our society were suddenly torn up by the
California legislators. Consider the reaction if everyone who
had confided in their lawyer, their physician, their psychiatrist, their psychologist. their social worker, their clergy, or
their mental health professional suddenly woke up one morning to find that California had retroactively opened up their
sealed records to people they did not want to see them.
[d. A.B. 3907 was not enacted.
191. See [d. at 2. But see LIFTON, supra note 88, at 264. Lifton states:
A close look at the lobby groups [for sealed records] reveals
that it is the conservative adoption agencies and the adoptive
parents, not the birth mothers, who are struggling to keep the
records closed. The adoption agencies are more afraid of losing
their business, and adoptive parents of losing their children,
than birth mothers are afraid of being found.
[d.
192. See, e.g., Dold, supra note 148, at C1. Dold quotes Illinois State Representative
John Cullerton as responding to the quest for open records by saying, "We don't want to
get into that. It's too controversial. That used to be an incredibly emotional issue in
Springfield." See also ADOPTION DEFENSE FUND, supra note 190, at 5 ("[Opening adoption records retroactively would] stimulate a flood of litigation against the state, agencies, attorneys and others who have had any role in past confidential adoptions.").

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

33

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 9

292

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:259

least secure greater openness in the future, and breaking down
the walls of secrecy is the ultimate goal.
For those adoption participants who will fail to profit under
such a proposal, all is not lost. The inequities of today's sealed
records statutes have induced adoption activist groups to become adept at accessing identifying records despite this present
legislation. Self-help organizations such as ALMAls3 currently
teach many methods to facilitate the reunification searches of
both adult adoptees and birth parents, thereby circumventing
the need to petition the courts. IS.

VIII. DISPELLING THE FEARS
A.

ADOPTION V. ABORTION

Opponents of open records frequently argue that greater access to adoption records will cause many birth mothers to abort
a child rather than carry it to term and relinquish that child to
the adoption process. lSII These opponents often characterize access to adoption records as a pro-life versus pro-choice issue. lSG
They believe that they are protecting adoptees because without
confidentiality, adoptees might never live to protest sealed
records at all. ls7
193. See supra note 23.
194. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 67. Aigner states:
[Tlhe movement organizations earn very high marks. They are
staffed primarily by volunteers, by and large motivated simply
by a desire to help. So far as search skills are concerned, they
tend to run circles around private investigators. Their understanding of adoption, search and reunification is unrivaled.
Time has shown most of these groups to be exemplary at the
service they provide.
Id.
195. See William L. Pierce, Letters to the Editor, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 8,
1986, at A8 ("[Bly failing to provide for a confidential adoption choice, many woman
would in effect have no option except a confidential abortion."). See also Michael Drexler, Adoptee Rights at Issue Push to Open Records Continues, PLAIN DEALER REPORTER,
November 9, 1992, at lB. Dr. John C. Willke, past president of National Right to Life,
headed an aggressive anti-abortion contingent that testified against an Ohio bill that
would have allowed adult adoptees access to their original birth certificates because the
group felt the bill promoted abortion. Id.
196. Evidence of this view exists in bumper stickers which declare, "Adoption, Not
Abortion."
197. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 195.
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Because adoption and abortion are both complex and emotionally charged issues, linking the two together acts as a convenient method for open record opponents to discourage legislative reform. Nonetheless, in the determination of whether
greater disclosure of adoption records is desirable, legislatur.es
should not reduce adoption and abortion to alternative
choices. le8 Some birth mothers dismiss the option of abortion
immediately for religious, health, moral, or other reasons. lee
Others struggle toward a resolution, but the ultimate decision by
a birth mother to give up a child for adoption occurs after she
has already ruled out abortion. 20o Generally, when a birth
mother walks into an adoption agency, she has already made the
decision to continue her pregnancy.201 She is only trying to figure out whether to keep the child or place it in an adoptive
home. 202
Although the threat of being found years later by their
adoptee might act as a determining factor in the decision to
abort for a few birth parents,20S such a decision remains within
their legal rights. 204 By reducing adoption and abortion to alter198. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION 120 (1990). Caplan states, "To anoint
adoption as the alternative to abortion is to link federal policy about the former with the
almost fanatical politics surrounding the latter."
199. A truly fair discussion of the motivating factors which drive a woman to abort
or bear a child is beyond the scope of this article.
200. This reasoning is based on the fact that a birth mother must first choose to
bear a child before she can decide to relinquish the child to the adoption process. This
decision to bear the child physically precludes the option of abortion.
201. Michael Drexler, Abortion Foes Oppose Bill for Access to Adoption Records,
PLAIN DEALER REPORTER, March 22, 1992, at 1A. Drexler quotes a social worker who
states, "If they wanted an abortion, they would have already done it. We're not dealing
with women who don't know that abortion is already an option."
202. [d.
203. But see Arndt, supra note 39, at 115-16. Arndt states:
[L]ogic also suggests that as many women might choose adoption over abortion if they felt that they were not necessarily
losing all contact forever with the child when they surrendered
him. The existence of "open" adoption, where visitation by
the natural parents is allowed after the adoption takes place,
and the rising popularity of private adoptions, which allow the
birth parents to choose the adoptive family for their child,
suggest that some birth parents have chosen adoption over
other alternatives when, and perhaps because, relinquishment
of the child did not mean complete loss of contact.
[d.

204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (establishing a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion).
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native choices for a birth mother, open record opponents drag
adoption participants into an entirely distinct controversy. An
artificial link between adoption and abortion should not deny
adult adoptees access to their original birth records. Thus, the
author argues that the effect of sealed record laws is to unfairly
protect the interests of unborn, putative adoptees against the
needs of living adoptees for disclosure.
B.

OPENING PANDORA'S

Box

Opponents of open records fear that adoptees everywhere,
armed with identifying information, will invade the lives of their
biological parents. 2011 These opponents commonly mention how
adoptees will simply show up on the doorsteps of their biological
parents and create a great disturbance in their lives. 2oe Such
fears are unwarranted for many reasons. First, greater access of
adoption records will not cause all adoptees to search for their
biological parents, for many adoptees are content to live with
the mystery of their past.207 Secondly, many adoptees feel compelled to search partially because they believe the sealed records
statutes wrongly deny them the ability to make their own
choice. 208 Making the search more accessible could potentially
lessen this urge. Third, adoptees who do decide to engage in a
search are generally very considerate of their biological parents'
feelings. 209 Most adoptees obtain some sort of counseling before
205. See ADOPTION DEFENSE FUND, supra note 190, at 2.
206. See id. ("[Many biological mothers] are terrorized by the prospect of their most
intimate past lives being public knowledge. Their husbands, their children, their coworkers, their neighbors-none of whom may know about an out-of-wedlock pregnancy
years earlier, even decades earlier-may react unpredictably when the child shows up on
their doorstep.").
207. See David Keene Leavitt, The Model Adoption Act: Return to a Balanced
View of Adoption, 19 FAM. L.Q. 141, 147 (1985) ("In those few jurisdictions where original birth records are not sealed, inquiry concerning birth parents is made only about 3
percent of the time. The most reliable estimates of frequency of searching in this country
fall between 3 and 5 percent of the total adoptees."). See also TRISELIOTIS. supra note 91
at 2 (stating that in Scotland, where adult adoptees are permitted access to their original
birth certificates, only a small number of adoptees feel compelled to seek out this genealogical information).
208. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 156. See 'also TRISELIOTIS, supra note 91, at 55.
Triseliotis finds generally that "adoptees who were given no information about their origins . . . were predominantly wanting to meet their natural parents. In contrast, those
who were given 'some information in a positive and understanding way were mostly interested in additional particulars about their origins." [d.
209. See TRISELIOTIS. supra note 91, at 44. Triseliotis states that in a study of
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attempting contact,210 and nearly all adoptees proceed cautiously due to their fear of rejection. 211 Adoptees understand
that their biological parents' lives will surely have changed and
that a reunion will likely startle biological parents who probably
have not had time to mentally prepare for such an encounter.
Lastly, not all searching adoptees desire to maintain a close relationship with their biological parents. 2l1l For most, ending the secrecy is the primary goal, and they are content simply to let the
future run its own course.
Opponents of greater disclosure also argue that opening
records will devastate adoptees who reunite with their biological
parents only to find that their concocted fantasies 213 are inaccurate.1l14 Some reunions will surely result in disappointment, but
the success of a reunion cannot be measured by a lack of pain or
suffering. Reunions are extremely emotional experiences' for
adoptees and birth parents, and each one is unique; but all reunions are successful in that they provide adoptees that sense of
identity or rootedness that was previously missing in their
lives.ll16 Even if adoptees are disappointed by what they find,
they can at least put an end to their fantasies and get on with
adoptees who were searching for their birth parents there was no evidence of any abuse
. or harassment of biological parents by adoptees who found their biological parents. [d.
"The various studies carried out so far suggest that the vast majority of adoptees act
thoughtfully and with great consideration for the feelings of both their birth and adoptive parents." [d. at 51.
2lO. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 15.
211. See Dear Abby, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1993, at EI0. An adoptee states, "there's
someone missing, someone I'm afraid to look for, because if I find her, she may reject me
again." [d.
212. See TRISELIOTIS. supra note 91, at 15 (discussing a study of adoptees in Scotland where access to original birth certificates is available to adult adoptees). Of the
seventy adoptees in the study, only sixty percent desired to even meet their biological
parents. The rest were content to simply have more information about their sociological
and biological background.
213. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 123 (stating that adoptees fantasi2e
about who their birth parents are, where they are, how they look, what kind of family
and work life they have, and why they gave the adoptee up).
214. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, supra note 110, at 8.
215. See REPORT OF THE ADOPTION TASK FORCE, MAINE DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES,
supra note 111, at 3. Each member of the adoption triad carries a perception of the other
members varying from fantasy to reality. The degree of acceptance of and comfort with
one's identity in relation to other members of the triad is often dependent upon one's
having access to information about and opportunity to come to terms with one's past,
present and future. [d.
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the rest of their lives.216
IX. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the history behind today's sealed records
statutes reminds us that adoptees' original birth records were
not always sealed.217 Permanent confidentiality became the
norm in the 1940's mainly in response to societal attitudes toward illegitimacy. us Sealed records laws may have served an important purpose when society frowned upon unwed mothers and
their "illegitimate" children, but times have changed. Adoption
participants have vocalized that permanent state-imposed confidentiality no longer serves their needs,u9 and various studies
have borne out this truth. 220
By permanently sealing original birth records, states inappropriately tell adoption participants that biological ties are insignificant. Maybe state legislatures fear the worst possible consequences of greater openness, or possibly they feel this
216. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 168. The authors quote an adoptee whose
biological mother wrote her one letter after receiving an initial phone call:
After that letter, she refused to answer my letters, and I finally stopped writing. I still hope that someday she will
change her mind and feel more comfortable meeting me and
letting me know her and her family. In thinking this over, I
have to say that although I was still confused, I was also relieved that my search was over. I could at last lay my fantasies
to rest. I knew who I looked like, where my talents came from
and who my ancestors were. I realized too that for the first
time in my life I had come into contact with a blood relative. I
found that immensely satisfying, as if this somehow bound me
more to the physical world.
Id. See also LIFTON, supra note 88, at 29. Lifton states that adoptees share the fantasy of
royal blood along with non-adoptees, but adoptees also have negative fantasies-of
whores, rapists, murderers:
[T]he possibilities are limitless. Back and forth they go between them, polarizing the good and the bad as it suits their
psychological need. But unlike the nonadopted who can eventually resolve their family romance by unifying the good and
bad parents into the one set they have, there is no way for the
Adoptee to resolve the polarization short of knowing about the
birth parents as real people.
Id.
217. See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 76-132 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 162.
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controversy is of less moment than other pressing social issues.
Nevertheless, even with states' current policy of secrecy, there is
no guarantee that biological parents or their adoptees will retain
their anonymity. Not only have self-help search organizations
become adept at assisting adoption members in locating their biological relatives, but a market has arisen for private investigators due to the profit they can make searching. Several legal
methods exist to maneuver around the sealed records statutes,1l1ll
and some searchers use illegal tactics as well. 222 The fact that
people are willing to break the law to get around the sealed
records statutes lays testament to the compelling need many feel
for this information. When people feel driven to disobey what
they perceive to be an inequitable law, perhaps society should
question the morality of the law, not the morality of the actual
law breaker.
History has demonstrated from time to time that unjust
laws subsist. Government often responds lethargically to the
need for legislative reform because it fears the unknown. The
continued existence of sealed adoption records statutes in the
face of needed reform is symptomatic of this fear; however, as
adoption participants place increasing pressure on their state
legislatures, states will finally be forced to address their needs.
The fear of openness by a minority of adoption participants no
longer warrants statutory protection. The personal experiences
of adoption participants demonstrate the propriety of greater
openness in the adoption process, and after all, no one is in a
better position to determine what is best for these participants
than adoptees, biological parents, and adoptive parents
themselves.

221. See generally AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23.
222. See 60 Minutes: Who Am I? (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 2, 1994). This segment centers around Sandy Musser, a woman who started her own search and reunification business. Musser was sentenced to four months in federal prison after being convicted of fraud, conspiracy and theft of government property. Musser's conviction
stemmed from her employment of a woman who impersonated government officers in
order to obtain identifying information from sealed adoption records. Musser believes
sealed records laws are immoral and considers her conduct a form of civil disobedience.
Id.
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